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Quoting Christopher Wright <[log in to unmask]>:

> Andreas Johansson palsalge
> >Quoting John Cowan <[log in to unmask]>:
> >
> >> Isidora Zamora scripsit:
> >>
> >> > Orthodox Christians do not
> >> > cremate those who have fallen asleep for this very reason.  It's not
> that
> >> > God cannot resurrect a body which has been completely destroyed, as by
> >> > modern methods of cremation, because He can, but it is shows disrespect
> to
> >> > God to go to a great deal of trouble to destroy something that you know
> He
> >> > is planning to use again.
> >>
> >> It will be destroyed in any event, unless the general resurrection comes
> >> within a century or so.
> >
> >This reminds me of one of the less convincing "proofs" that Christianity
> must
> >be false I've heard; a guy argued that the general resurrection would be an
> >extremely messy affair, since alot of atoms are going to belong to multiple
> >people's bodies. That, in turn, reminded me of Feynman's suggestion that
> all
> >electrons are _one_ electron, which goes back and forth in time (much like
> >Marvin!). But back on the previous OT track, what this rises is the
> question
> >in what sense my body on two different occasion is "the same" (particularly
> if
> >I've been cremated and resurrected in between!). The actual material
> >components of a body are not normally considered important for this kind of
> >identity - over the last year, a big proportion of the atoms in my body has
> >been replaced, but no-one would say I've acquired a new body in the process.
> I
> >can see no other conclusion that the identity - and there must be an
> identity,
> >if resurrection is to mean anything, and this whole discussion of course
> >presupposes it does - rests rather in the "structure" or "organization" of
> the
> >body. But that is pretty fundamentally altered at death - I do not think
> what
> >it would be controversal to define the death of a multicellular creature as
> >the cessation of the entire-body level organization. What all this leads to
> is
> >the question if cremating my body makes it meaningfully less "me" than
> simple
> >death.
> >
> >It of course also ties in to the sometimes advanced idea that after-life
> >really is a simulation of sorts - if the structure/organization is the
> >important thing, it makes little difference if it's realized as electrons
> in
> >God's laptop* or an as actual material body. Which raises the
> counterquestions
> >i) who's to say the present life isn't a simulation too, and ii) what
> exactly
> >is the difference between a simulation and a "reality"; both consist of a
> >number of elements interacting according to some rules.
>
> It's simpler than that. You take any movement paradox you like and add the
> caveat that time comes in discrete amounts--it's digital rather than analog.
> Then you get many universes, each made of one "frame" of time. You get a new
> universe every time. Thus, there are two methods of resurrecting people in
> their own bodies:
>
> 1) Forge them. Just make new ones. Does the difference really matter? I've
> had a billion times a billion bodies just writing this message.

I think I made it clear I was assuming that the difference does indeed matter.

> 2) Yank them out of an unused universe. Since that frame's already been
> experienced, who needs it?

This seems to presuppose the existence of "external" time, the existence of
which I cannot guarantee.

                                                       Andreas